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This study examined decisions made by householders under wildfire threat. Data were 
obtained from interviews with survivors of severe wildfires in Victoria (Australia) on 7 
February 2009 which killed 172 civilians and destroyed more than 2,000 homes. Prior to this, 
Australian fire agency community wildfire safety policy was that residents should: ‘Prepare, 
stay and defend or leave early’. Most of the 223 interviewees who stayed and defended did so 
because this was their wildfire safety plan, and they believed that they would be successful 
despite the predicted extreme fire danger weather. In 79% of cases, defence was successful; 
for the remaining 21%  the house was destroyed and several lives were imperilled. Of the 216 
who left for a safer location only 39% said that this was their wildfire safety plan; for most, 
the action of leaving was triggered by realisation of the imminent threat posed by the fire; 
36% self-evacuated under hazardous conditions. The findings suggest that community 
wildfire safety programs should emphasize: (a) the risks associated with staying to defend a 
property; and (b) how householders should prepare in order to leave safely if a fire threatens. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Because of its climate, vegetation types, and land use and human settlement patterns, 
the south-eastern Australian State of Victoria has a long history of disastrous bushfires 
associated with periods of drought and days of extreme fire danger weather—high maximum 
temperatures, low relative humidities, and strong winds. Over the period 1900-2008 there 
were 296 recorded civilian deaths caused by bushfires [1]. In this paper we use the term 
‘bushfire’ when discussing the Australian context, and the synonym ‘wildfire’ when 
discussing trans-national safety issues. 
 Following investigations into multi-fatality bushfires in Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania 1967-1983, Australasian fire agencies concluded that (a) civilians were most likely 
to die because of either the effects of radiant heat or as a result of a motor vehicle accident 
while fleeing at the last moment, and (b) suitably prepared homes could be defended against 
bushfires while providing a safe refuge for people during the passage of the main fire front 
[2]. These conclusions informed the Australasian Fire Authorities Council’s (AFAC) 2005 
community safety position that able-bodied people should be encouraged to remain on their 
property so as to defend their home when threatened by a bushfire: “...By extinguishing small 
initial ignitions, people of adequate mental, emotional, and physical fitness, equipped with 
appropriate skills, and basic resources, can save a building that would otherwise be lost in a 
fire...People should decide well in advance of a bushfire whether they will stay to defend 
them or leave if a bushfire threatens” [3, p. 6]. This position came to be summarised as 
‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ [4] and was adopted as community bushfire safety 
policy by Australasian fire agencies. Such a policy differs from that adopted in most North 
American fire jurisdictions where evacuation of residents threatened by a wildfire is the 
preferred community safety strategy [5]. However, following the 2009 Victorian bushfires 
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(described below) Victoria Police reports that 113 people had perished in their homes [6] 
resulted in the policy coming under intense critical scrutiny [7]. 
 Recent trends suggest that wildfires will increasingly pose threats to communities in 
Australia and other countries (notably the United States, Canada, Spain, and Greece) largely 
because of (a) climate change, (b) fuel and land management practices, and (c) increasing 
numbers of dwellings in or adjacent to wildland areas [8]. Improving community wildfire 
safety thus seems likely to challenge the capabilities of fire and land management agencies in 
these and other countries in the foreseeable future. More frequent serious wildfires and more 
households in at-risk locations requires fire agency personnel to better understand residents’ 
safety-related decisions about staying and defending homes or evacuating, and factors likely 
to determine the outcomes of such decisions. 
In the remainder of this paper we first note the limited research published so far about 
householders’ decisions and actions during wildfires. We describe the disastrous bushfires 
which affected many communities in Victoria on 7 February 2009. We present findings from 
post-fire field interviews with a sample of survivors and relate these to householders’ 
decisions to either stay and defend their homes or leave, and we discuss possible implications 
of these findings for community wildfire safety policy and practice. 
1.1  Community wildfire safety research 
 Considerable research investigating aspects of community wildfire safety has been 
reported. Arguably, the largest thread of  wildfire social science research has focussed on 
reducing vulnerability of dwellings to wildfire attack and has employed householder surveys 
inquiring about their wildfire mitigation intentions and actions (such as vegetation clearing 
and using fire-resistant building materials). The findings, overall, suggest that major 
determinants of householders’ willingness to undertake mitigation activities include: 
(a) perception of bushfire risk; (b) knowledge of mitigation options; (c) acceptance of some 
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responsibility for property protection; (d) expectations that mitigation actions will be 
effective; and (e) beliefs that the costs of mitigation activities are acceptable in relation to 
other household priorities [9 - 14]. Other research findings suggest the likely importance of 
factors such as householder gender [15]; residents’ attachment to place [16, 17]; and informal 
social community interaction networks [18]. 
 Relatively few investigations of experiences of householders affected directly by 
significant wildfires and what they did in response to warnings or threats, and why, have been 
reported. Only four such studies were located in the literature2. In surveys of three US 
communities affected by wildfires McCaffrey and Winter [19] found that many of the 551 
residents surveyed who had been threatened by a wildfire chose to wait and see what 
developed before making a final decision about whether the perceived risk warranted 
evacuation. Cohn et al. [20] interviewed a total of 183 residents of three US communities 
about their wildfire evacuation experiences and identified several factors which made 
evacuation problematic for some residents, such as uncertainty about their actual level of risk 
and expected lack of facilities for evacuees. Proudley [21] interviewed 38 couples affected by 
a nine-fatality bushfire in South Australia and concluded that a policy of ‘prepare, stay and 
defend or leave early’ failed to take into account the complexities of choices facing 
families—especially mothers’ concerns for the safety of their children—under imminent 
bushfire threat. Tibbits and Whittaker [22] analysed nine focus group discussions (73 
participants) about experiences during bushfires in north-eastern Victoria in 2003, and 
particularly householders’ understanding and actions concerning the ‘prepare, stay and 
defend or leave early’ policy. They concluded that while most residents had a good 
understanding of what was involved in preparing a property and defending it against a 
bushfire, few had a sound understanding of what was involved in leaving safely (that is, self-
evacuating) before a bushfire presented a threat to life. 
6 
 
 Taken together, the four studies suggest that the decisions householders make and the 
actions they take when warned of a possible wildfire threat involve several interrelated 
factors, such as (a) perceived risk; (b) perceived options and potential costs and benefits of 
acting on each; (c) household resources and vulnerabilities; and (d) prior plans and 
preparations. What seems to be lacking from the current literature is data from householders 
whose properties have been seriously threatened, or impacted, by wildfire. In particular, 
detailed accounts of householders’ survival-related decisions and actions, including major 
determinants, are needed. The present study aims to contribute to remedying this knowledge 
gap. 
1.2  The 7 February 2009 Victorian bushfires. 
 On 7 February 2009 the State of Victoria experienced Australia’s worst single day of 
bushfires in recorded history. Extreme fire danger weather was predicted by the Bureau of 
Meteorology six days in advance. Warnings of extreme fire risk expected on the day were 
broadcast frequently, and reported extensively in daily newspapers during the preceding 
week, as noted by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission of inquiry [7]. 
 From mid-morning, numerous fires broke out across much of Victoria. As predicted, 
the weather conditions were extreme, with high temperatures (>44 degrees Celsius), low 
relative humidities (<10%), and strong winds (>100kph) across most of the State. The rainfall 
for the previous 12 months was well below the annual average, and this followed a decade of 
drought conditions. There were 173 bushfire-related fatalities in total1; more than 2,000 
homes were destroyed; and several communities were devastated; resulting in severe 
economic, social, and environmental costs, amounting to at least US$4 billion [7]. 
 In the aftermath of the fires a Royal Commission of inquiry was established, which 
delivered its Final Report on 31 July, 2010 [7]. Fire agencies were criticised for failures to 
provide timely warnings to communities under imminent threats. Evidence presented to the 
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Royal Commission suggested that there may have been fewer fatalities and injuries if people 
had made (and acted upon) decisions more appropriate to their situation in relation to the 
extreme weather conditions, especially decisions to leave—self-evacuate--early. Table 1 [23] 
summarizes the circumstances of the 172 civilian deaths attributed directly to events on the 
day of the fires. 
________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
________________________ 
The high percentage of fatalities in or near destroyed homes contributed to subsequent 
modification of the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ community bushfire safety 
policy [3] so that the dangers of staying and defending during extreme fire danger weather 
conditions were emphasised and leaving early was promoted as being the safer option [24]: 
the new policy was encapsulated as “Prepare. Act. Survive.” [ 25 ]. 
2. Data Collection and Analysis 
 Immediately following the 7 February 2009 bushfires senior Bushfire Cooperative 
Research Centre3 staff organised a multi-agency research task force to investigate aspects of 
the fires and report to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. A major component 
of the work of the task force was to interview a cross-section of householders in areas 
affected by eight particularly destructive fire complexes4. 
2.1. Householders interviewed 
 Interviews were conducted with 496 residents, from different households, whose 
properties were impacted or threatened by the worst bushfires. There were 320 men (65%) 
and 173 women (35%), while the gender of three interviewees was not recorded and not 




 Thirty-nine of those interviewed were not at home on the day of the fires by chance 
rather than by decisions about bushfire safety--they were absent for a range of work, 
recreational, and family related reasons. Ten others relocated to a presumed safer location the 
day before the fires. Of the 447 householders at their residences on the day of the fires, 223 
stayed and defended their homes, 216 left, and 8 sheltered in place passively. 
2.2. Interview procedures 
 The following is a summary, a detailed account is in McLennan et al. [26]. Interviews 
were semi-structured, a copy of the interview guide is in the Appendix. Most interviews were 
conducted by 11 staff or research students associated with Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology (RMIT) University or La Trobe University. Other interviewers were community 
safety staff from several state fire agencies. Most interviews lasted between 20 and 40 
minutes. Interviews were recorded digitally, and transcribed and checked by professional 
transcription services. 
2.3 Interview transcript analyses 
 A content-coding and rating scheme was constructed, following the interview topic 
guide, to extract relevant information from the interviews in order to establish trends and 
identify associations among reported plans, actions, outcomes and experiences. The coding 
categories used are summarised in Table 2. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Each transcript was coded independently by two coders; reliability indices are reported in the 
Results section. Disagreements were resolved by joint reviews of the transcripts in question, 
discussion and consensus. 
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 The overall analysis procedure involved four steps: (i) coding householder statements 
in each transcript by two coders independently, and agreement; (ii) copying the coded 
transcript elements into corresponding coding and rating categories in an nVivo8 text-
management software file; (iii) entering coding and rating values into an SPSS data file and 
quantitative analyses; (iv) examining participants’ statements in the nVivo8 coding categories 
for themes [27] to assist in the interpretation of the quantitative findings. 
3. Results 
 Findings are presented under three sub-headings: 3.1 Plans, actions, outcomes, safety 
issues; 3.2 Preparations for a bushfire: those who stayed and defended, and those who left; 
3.3 Deciding to stay and defend or to leave when there is a bushfire threat. 
3.1 Plans, actions, outcomes, safety issues 
 As indicated previously, of the 496 householders interviewed 39 were not at their 
residences on the day of the fires by chance (17, 44%, of these homes were destroyed). Their 
data have been omitted from subsequent analyses. Table 3 shows bushfire survival plans or 
intentions of the remaining 457 householders who made bushfire survival-related decisions. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Only 10 (2%) householders acted upon fire danger weather warnings from authorities by 
leaving on the previous day. Of the 229 householders who intended to stay and defend their 
home, 80% did so (another sheltered passively because of the perceived intensity of the fire); 
while 20% changed their minds because of the perceived threat posed by the fire (another left 
the previous day because of the predicted severe fire danger weather conditions). Of the 103 
householders who intended to leave safely, 65% did so; 24% left under hazardous conditions; 
while 11% attempted to defend or sheltered passively because they decided that it was not 
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safe to leave. Of the 125 householders who intended to wait and see what developed, or had 
no plan, or described an unclear plan, 70% left; while 27% attempted to defend their home 
(and 3% sheltered passively) because they judged that it was too dangerous to leave. 
 For the 216 householders who left, 44% of their homes were destroyed; for the 223 
householders who stayed and defended, 20% of their homes were destroyed: for this sample 
of householders defended homes were less likely to be lost compared with undefended 
homes: χ2  (n = 439; df = 1) = 27.50, p < .001, V = .26. This is consistent with previous 
findings that defended homes are more likely to survive a bushfire than undefended 
homes [28, 29]. For the 181 householders who both planned to stay and defend and did so, 
21% of their homes were destroyed. This last finding that prior planning to stay and defend 
did not increase the likelihood of successful home defence was unexpected, possible 
explanations are discussed in Section 3.2. 
 Table 4 summarizes the major potential safety-compromising issues described by the 
439 householders who stayed and defended or left on the day (responses from those who left 
the previous day or who sheltered passively were omitted). 
____________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
____________________ 
Safety compromising issues were defined as any events or circumstances which householders 
described as having threatened successful implementation of their bushfire survival 
intentions. Lack of time to prepare to respond to the direct fire threat (because of inadequate 
warning information) was reported to be a potential, and for some an actual, safety-
compromising factor by a little more than one-third of those stayed and defended; and by a 
little less than one-third of those who left. Feelings of panic, fear, or anxiety; the fire intensity 
being much greater than expected; and feeling responsible for the safety of dependent family 
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members were reported to be issues by appreciable numbers of both those who stayed and 
defended and those who left. 
 Many of those who stayed and defended described how (a) failure of household 
firefighting equipment—mostly water pumps and plastic pipes, fittings and water tanks; (b) a 
pre-existing lack of stored water because of the drought; and (c) fatigue or injury to 
themselves or family members during the event had potentially compromised their survival. 
Many of those who left described lack of official information and warnings about specific 
locations under threat, and roads obstructed by fallen trees or downed power lines as 
potentially compromising their safety. 
 Sixty-six householders interviewed described having a backup, or fall-back, plan if 
their initial plan could not be implemented, or failed: originally, 52 had planned to stay and 
defend, 8 had planned to leave, 6 had an unclear plan or intended to wait and see what 
developed. In almost all cases the backup plan was to take last-resort shelter near to the 
house—in a vehicle on a cleared area, in a home swimming pool or farm dam, or in an out-
building or improvised fire shelter such as a cellar. Few of these fall-back plans appeared to 
have been developed in detail or prepared for. However, 14 of these 66 householders 
survived by implementing their last-resort shelter backup plan. 
3.2 Preparations for a wildfire: those who stayed and defended and those who left 
 Table 5 compares those who stayed and defended with those who left on ratings of 
five indicators of bushfire readiness. The 4-level rating scales are described in Table 2. Chi-
square analyses showed that householders who stayed and defended their properties 
described significantly higher levels of long-term preparation to survive a bushfire; greater 
knowledge of bushfires; and higher levels of preparation to survive if a bushfire was to occur 
on the day in question. Those who stayed and defended also received somewhat higher 
overall ratings of awareness of fire danger weather, awareness of an approaching bushfire, 
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psychological readiness to act when threatened. While intriguing, the differences were not 
sufficient to reach the criterion for statistical significance. 
____________________ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
____________________ 
A higher percentage of men (57%) than women (36%) stayed and defended. However, Chi-
square analyses showed that there were no gender X readiness indicator interactions—that is, 
within the categories of those who stayed and defended, and those who left, men and women 
did not differ significantly in their rating patterns and only combined results are shown. 
 Supplementary analyses showed that there were no significant differences between 
those who defended their homes successfully and those whose homes were destroyed on: 
(a) overall ratings of long-term preparation; (b) knowledge of bushfire; or (c) preparation on 
the day. Taken with the finding noted in Section 3.1 that having planned to stay and defend 
did not increase the probability of defending successfully, these results suggest that 
householder success or failure in property defence on the day was determined to some extent 
by external factors such as the extreme weather conditions, fuel load and proximity, ground 
slope, and building construction vulnerability--as well as by chance (Table 4). 
3.3 Deciding to stay and defend or to leave when there is a wildfire threat 
 While householders were not specifically asked, a somewhat higher percentage of 
householders who stayed and defended volunteered mention of an emotional attachment to 
their home and surrounding environment (43%) compared with those who left (27%): 
χ2 (n = 439; df = 1) = 11.21, p < .001, V = .16. Also, a somewhat higher percentage of those 
who stayed and defended mentioned links to neighbours and other local residents (58%) 
compared with those who left (40%): χ2 (n = 439; df = 1) = 13.57, p < .001, V = .18. 
Together, these suggest that for some staying and defending was associated with a feeling of 
13 
 
attachment to home and community. This finding is consistent with that reported by Paveglio 
et al. [30]. Of those who stayed and defended, 35 (16%) mentioned that they had expected to 
receive a specific warning from authorities that their property would be threatened by the 
fires while 33 (15%) said that they had not expected such a warning. Of those who left, 53 
(25%) mentioned that they had expected a specific warning from authorities, while 8 (4%) 
said that they had not expected such a warning. These differences suggest that those who 
stayed and defended were more likely to believe that they were responsible for their own 
safety under bushfire threat: χ2 (n = 129; df = 1) = 17.00, p < .001, V = .38. 
 Table 6 lists 12 potential determinants of decisions to either stay and defend or to 
leave which were mentioned by householders as decision influences. Those who stayed and 
defended were more likely to report self-efficacy; prior commitment to their plan; and 
outcome efficacy as decision influences. Those who left were more likely to report an 
environmental trigger (smoke, flames, embers); family safety concerns; perceived threat from 
the fire; and warnings of danger from neighbours and family as decision influences. Other 
decision influences mentioned by householders included: information about the fires 
broadcast by local radio services; lack of time in which to respond to the fire threat (due 
mostly to lack of warnings); and the need to protect animals—both household pets and 
livestock. However, differences between those who stayed and defended and those who left 
in the frequency of these reported influences were small and not significant. 
____________________ 








4.1 Limitations of the study 
 Before discussing implications of the findings, potential limitations of the research are 
acknowledged. Interviews were conducted on properties where residents were present on 
days when task force teams were in the area. Because of the level of destruction and 
community dislocation it was not possible to recruit a random representative sample of 
householders in the fire-affected locations studied. While those interviewed covered a range 
of locations, dwelling types, household compositions, and outcomes, householders whose 
homes were destroyed are probably under-represented among the interviewees because they 
were no longer able to reside in the local area. 
 Most survivors would have been exposed to subsequent media reporting on the fires, 
which may have influenced aspects of their interviews. Hindsight bias, in which knowledge 
of event outcomes influences judgements of the predictability of the outcomes [31], may thus 
have had some effects on householders’ reports of events. However, there seem no grounds to 
suppose that these effects would differ markedly overall for those who stayed and defended 
compared those who left. Issues of hindsight bias and survivors’ recollections are discussed 
in more detail by McLennan et al. [32]. 
4.2 Preparations, warnings and information 
 The findings from this sample of bushfire-affected householders suggest that fire 
agencies had been only moderately successful in their prior information- and education-based 
endeavours to prepare Victorian communities for bushfires. Only about half of those 
interviewed indicated a high level of awareness of the risks implied by the predicted fire 
danger weather. Of those who stayed and defended their property, a little less than half had 
undertaken a high level of preparation for defence. Of those who left when threatened, less 
than half had undertaken significant planning and preparation for such an eventuality. It 
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appears that many residents in bushfire prone areas prior to February 2009 did not perceive 
community bushfire safety messages as being relevant to their situation.   
 It seems that both fire agency community safety personnel and residents of at-risk 
communities had poor appreciations of the likely intensities of bushfires burning under the 
weather conditions on the day [7]. The significant percentage (20%) of defended homes 
destroyed, together with the finding that house-defence success was unrelated to level of 
property preparation, suggests that the messages received by householders about the ‘prepare 
stay and defend’ component of agencies’ bushfire community safety policy [2-4] did not take 
sufficient account of increased vulnerabilities under such extreme bushfire conditions--of 
houses, domestic firefighting equipment, and householders. 
 The reports by many of those who left at the last moment under imminent threat 
suggest that the ‘...or leave early’ component of agencies’ bushfire community safety policy 
[2-4] was poorly understood—consistent with the findings reported previously by Tibbits and 
Whittaker [22] following the 2003 bushfires in north-east Victoria. 
 The accounts given, both by those who stayed and defended and those who left under 
threat, indicated perceived failings in systems and procedures for warning and informing 
residents under bushfire threat during extreme weather conditions. Evidence presented 
subsequently to the Bushfires Royal Commission [7] supported the reports of many of those 
interviewed that their safety was jeopardised by a lack of timely and accurate information 
about the location and speed and direction of travel of bushfires threatening communities. 
This issue seems likely to remain a challenge for fire agencies. Message texting and social 
media did not play a significant role during the 2009 Victorian bushfires. It remains to be 
seen if these emerging communication modalities can be harnessed to enhance the 
effectiveness of wildfire threat warnings in the future, notwithstanding optimistic claims by 
some [33, 34]. 
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4.3 Deciding to either stay and defend or to leave 
 Inevitably, the data-reduction procedures which enabled quantitative analyses to 
identify trends and associations among issues reported by those interviewed blur the varied 
and complex reasons which determined any given individual householder’s decision to stay 
and defend or to leave in the face of bushfire threat. Transcripts often described quite 
complex householder circumstances where competing threats and priorities had to be 
managed—for example, safety of family members versus severe financial losses—and such 
individual experiences were lost. However, broad themes are apparent. The data suggest that 
for many who stayed and defended, their reasons included an emotional attachment to their 
home and neighbours and a belief that they were, at least to some extent, responsible for 
protecting their property against bushfire rather than relying wholly on authorities. Acquired 
knowledge of bushfire risk generated a plan to prepare, stay and defend in expectation of 
success. While commitment to their plan to stay and defend was the principal decision driver 
for most, some abandoned this plan when they judged that the threat posed by the 
approaching fire was greater than anticipated. A sub-set of those who stayed and defended 
did so because they judged that there was no time to leave safely and that attempting to 
defend the house was a safer option than fleeing. 
 It is more difficult to specify the decision-drivers of those who left. For most, it seems 
that the major distal factor was absence of a plan to prepare stay and defend. However, there 
appeared to be considerable variation among householders in what drove decisions to not 
plan to stay and defend. Some did not perceive their home to be at risk of bushfire attack. 
Others judged the likely danger to family members as too great to warrant defence. However, 
only a small number perceived the danger associated with a potential bushfire to be so high as 
to warrant detailed planning and preparation to minimise the risk. For all, a trigger event was 
the proximal decision factor. For a very few, this trigger was the fire danger weather 
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predictions. For most, the trigger event was a warning (either official or unofficial) of the 
danger posed: as credible information about the proximity or intensity of the fire; and/or as 
sensory cues from the environment—smoke, embers, flames. 
 A small, but significant, percentage of householders planned to wait and see how the 
situation developed before committing to either staying and defending or leaving. While fire 
agencies warn against taking such an approach to warnings of a possible bushfire threat [25] 
the limited available evidence [19, 20, 22, 35] indicates that a significant percentage of 
residents will do so in the face of a wildfire threat warning. Clearly, further research is 
needed so authorities better understand the reasons behind householders’ planning to wait and 
see what develops when advised of a wildfire threat, and the implications such thinking has 
for community wildfire safety endeavours. 
5. Conclusions 
1. The limitations inherent in a post-disaster field research study such as this one mean that 
findings should be regarded as suggestive. In particular, the interview sample was largely one 
of convenience and generalisations of findings about householder preparedness to other 
communities are questionable. However, two subsequent post-bushfire research studies in 
Western Australia, Lake Clifton (January 2011) and Perth Hills (February 2011) found 
similarly low levels of householder preparedness for bushfire [36, 37]. Additional post-
wildfire investigations of householders’ decisions and actions are needed to further confirm 
and extend the present findings and to evaluate the effectiveness of fire agencies’ current and 
future community wildfire policies, priorities, and programs.  
2. Unless there are appreciable changes in Australian community attitudes generally toward 
bushfire risk, it seems likely that few householders will leave their home and self-evacuate to 
a safer location based solely on fire danger weather prediction-based warnings. For most 
residents who do not plan to defend their home, a decision to leave will be made only when a 
18 
 
trigger event, such as a credible warning message (official or unofficial) or environmental 
cues (such as smoke, embers, flames), indicates an actual bushfire threat. 
3. A distinction needs to be made, by at-risk householders and fire agency staff alike, 
between the risks faced by householders under typical wildfire threat conditions and dangers 
entailed by wildfires burning under extreme fire danger weather conditions such as those 
which occurred in Victoria on 7 February 2009. This is especially relevant to property 
defence, where preparations which may well be adequate under typical wildfire weather 
conditions are likely to prove inadequate under extreme conditions. Educational material 
about property defence against wildfires should emphasize the risks involved and the need for 
a sound back-up plan in case defence fails. Specifying adequacy of property preparedness for 
defence in relation to different weather conditions is a formidable challenge for wildfire 
safety agencies. 
4. The difficulties that many residents reported in knowing when to leave safely suggests that 
Australasian fire agencies may need to provide more detailed and specific information to 
householders about evacuating in the face of bushfire threat. Following the 2009 Victorian 
fires, AFAC revised aspects of its official community bushfire safety position to give more 
weight to the ‘leave early’ option: “People usually have two safe options when threatened by 
bushfire: leaving early or staying and defending adequately prepared properties. Leaving 
early is always the safest option” [24, p. 1]. It is probably unwise to assume that householders 
residing in wildfire-prone locations will necessarily have a sound understanding of what 
leaving “early” means for their particular circumstances, and the planning and preparations 
needed to ensure their safety in the face of a wildfire threat. At present, it seems almost 
inevitable that for many who do not intend to stay and defend, leaving will follow a period of 
waiting and seeing. This needs to be addressed directly by agencies, not simply dismissed as 





1 The official total death toll due to the bushfires is 173: 172 civilians and a firefighter killed 
by a falling tree during ongoing containment operations on 17 February [7]. It has been 
estimated that during the heatwave in south-eastern Australia 17 January to 8 February 2009 
some 374 people died from heat-related causes not associated with bushfires [38]. 
2 A qualitative analysis of a sample of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 2009 
Victorian bushfires task force interview transcripts was reported to the Victorian Bushfires 
Royal Commission [39]. A preliminary analysis using data from 49 task force interviews with 
survivors of the Murrindindi Fire complex was reported previously [32]. While less 
comprehensive than the present study, the findings in both the previous reports were 
consistent with those reported here. Strawderman et al. [40 ] conducted a telephone survey of 
residents affected by the 2007 San Diego wildfires but the focus was on what type of warning 
was more likely to result in evacuation. Several studies have been reported which 
investigated householders’ reported intentions if threatened by a wildfire [e.g., 16, 41, 42] 
3 Information about the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre is available at 
www.bushfirecrc.com  
4 The fire complexes were: Beechworth-Mudgegonga, Bendigo, Bunyip, Churchill, Horsham, 
Kilmore East, Murrindindi, and Narre Warren [7]. 
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Bushfires Research Taskforce Human Behaviour and Community Safety 
Interviewer Guidelines 
 




Before the interview 
 
 -Introduce self 
 -Introduce research 
 -Provide ethics statement 
 - Stress independence from agencies and government 
 - Explain purpose 
 - Confidentiality 
 - Contact details 
 - Further research 
 - Obtain consent 
 - If consent is obtained, proceed with the interview 
 
Interview questions and prompts 
 
Starting question 
- Tell me what happened to you during the fire 
During the discussion prompt for: 
 
Preparation 
 -How did you prepare? (timeframe) 
 - How well-prepared did you feel? 
 -Did you have a plan? If so, what was it? 
 
Information and warnings 
 -When and how did you first become aware about the fire? 
 - When did you realise the fire would impact your property? 




- What did you do (Stay, protect property, shelter in place, wait and see, leave early,   
leave late)? Why? 
 - What did other household members do? Why? 
 - Who was there? What were they doing? 
 - Did you get any help? Did you help anyone? Did you see anyone else? 





 - When did you leave? 
 - Do you think you left early enough? 
 - Was there a trigger for leaving? 
 - Where did you go? 
 - How did you get there? 
 - When did you return? 
 
Future 
 - Is there anything you would do differently? 







Circumstances associated with 172 civilian fatalities 
_________________________________________________ 
Activity at time of death    % 
_________________________________________________ 
Sheltering inside/near a structure   65 
Fleeing: car and/or foot    17 
Defending a dwelling       9 
Caught in the open on foot      3 
Other (e.g., camping, subsequent heart attack)   5 
__________________________________________________ 




Interview Transcript Coding and Rating Categories 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Household composition on the day, and interviewee details. 
2. Whereabouts on 7 February 2009, reasons: Chance? Safety? 
3. Reported actions if present on the property on the day of the fires: stayed and actively 
defended, left before fire impact, sheltered passively. 
4. Reported outcomes: house survived, damaged, destroyed; took last-resort shelter, left 
safely, left in danger. 
5. Stated plans prior to 7 February 2009: ‘stay and defend’, ‘leave’, ‘wait and see’, ‘no 
plan’—if no unambiguous statement: ‘unclear plan’. 
6. Reported evidence of training, experience with bushfires, reading of agency bushfire 
material. 
7. Reported insurance coverage. 
8. Reported evidence of level of long-term preparation for bushfire: 
Extensive (4): vegetation clearing, independent water supply and independent power 
source, plus two or more of: sprinklers, implements, water containers, protective 
clothing; or detailed evacuation plan including three or more of: safety of documents 
and valuables, arrangements for pets/livestock, destination, evacuation routes, 
necessities for family needs for 24 hours or more. 
Some (3): vegetation clearing, plus up to two or three of the above, in relation to 
staying and defending, or to leaving. 
Minimal (2): limited vegetation clearing, or discussion of leaving if threatened. 
Nil (1). 
 
9. Reported evidence of awareness of fire danger weather on 7 February 2009: 
High (4): Frequent acts of vigilance during the day including monitoring the local 
radio, checking agency web sites, scanning the environment for smoke or embers, 
telephoning friends or family. 
Some (3): Infrequent checks of two or more of the above. 
Minimal (2): Radio on, or occasional glance at the environment. 
Nil (1). 
 
10. Reported evidence of physical readiness for a bushfire on 7 February 2009: 
High (4): equipment ready and tested, water containers filled, protective clothing 
ready; or bags packed and ready, pets/livestock readied, vehicle(s) fuelled and ready. 









11. Reported evidence of knowledge of bushfires: 
High (4): Two or more of training, reading, practice, experience. 
Some (3): Attended CFA meeting(s) or reading. 
Minimal (2): General knowledge from the media. 
Nil (1). 
 
12. Reported evidence of level of awareness of approaching fire: 
High (4): Early awareness of a fire, active attempts to track location. 
Some (3): Awareness of fire somewhere in the area. 
Minimal (2): Only aware when threat obvious. 
Nil (1): Taken by surprise. 
 
13. Readiness to act if fire threatened 
 
High (4): Acknowledged threat, anticipated impact; immediate action 
Some (3): Aware of threat, some concern, some uncertainty about action 
Minimal (2): Aware of a fire, threat not personalized, uncertainty/hesitation 
Nil (1): Surprised: inaction or ‘panic’ reaction 
 
14. Expected an official warning of bushfire threat to community? 
 
15. Report of potential influence(s) on decision making (Table 6). 
16. Other key issues or events potentially related to outcome (Table 4). 






Householders’ bushfire survival plans and actions (N = 457) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Plan        Action 
   _________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Left previous Defended Defended Sheltered Left      Left      Total 
   day  successfully failed  passively safely      danger 
   %   (n)  %   (n)  %   (n)  %   (n)  %   (n)      %   (n) %       (n) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stay and defend  <1  (1)  31  (143) 8  (38)  <1   (2)   6  (29)       4  (16)    50  (229) 
Leave safely    2  (8)     2  (9)  <1  (1)  <1  (1)  13  (59)      5  (25)    23  (103) 
Wait and see  <1  (1)  <1   (2)  <1  (1)    0  (0)  3  (15)     2  (7)        6  (26) 
No plan     0  (0)     3  (14)  2  (7)                 1  (3)               5  (23)      3  (14)     13 (61) 
Unclear plan    0  (0)     2  (8)  <1  (2)  <1  (2)  3  (12)       4  (16)      8   (38) 






Potential safety-compromising issues described by more than five percent of householders present on the day and 
differences between those who stayed and defended and those who left (N = 439) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Safety-compromising   Percentage reportinga Total number  χ2 (df = 1)   pb,c    Cramer’s 
issue        reporting (%)a     V 
     _________________ 
     Stayed and  Left 
     defended 
     (n = 223)     (n = 216) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lack of time to prepare               37%  32%    152 (37%)     1.13   .25 ns  .01 
Equipment failured   48%  17%    145 (33%)  47.19  <.001  .33 
Lack of official information  18%  33%    111 (25%)  13.75  <.001  .18 
Panic, fear, or anxiety   18%  19%      80 (18%)  <.01      .97 ns  .01 
Lack of watere    23%  5%      62 (14%)  27.14  <.001  .26 
Fire more intense than expected              57%  43%      56 (13%)     0.76   .38 ns  .05 
House vulnerabilityf   18%    7%      55 (13%)  11.12   .001  .17 
Householder injury/fatigue  17%    4%      46 (10%)  16.76  <.001  .20 
Responsibility for dependents  10%    7%      37   (8%)    0.86     .35 ns  .05 
Evacuation route blocked    4%    7%      25   (6%)     1.74    .19 ns  .07 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
a Several householders reported more than one issue so the percentages sum to more than 100%. 
b Bonferroni critical p value = .05/10 = .005 
c ns = not significant 
d Most failures were associated with water supply: power, pumps; plastic pipes, fittings, water tanks. 
e Mostly, this involved low levels of stored water due to the drought conditions. 




Comparison of bushfire readiness indicator ratings for those who stayed and defended with those who left 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Readiness Indicatora   Action         Readiness Rating Level (%)  n χ2 (df = 3)     pbc       Cramer’s V 
       _____________________________ 
       Nil Minimal   Some High 
Long-term preparation (.94)  Defended   4      16       32  48  213 
     Left  19      38       35    8  189 94.12  <.001  .48 
Knowledge of bushfire (.89)  Defended   4      15       53  28  171 
     Left  23      34       29  14  122 49.79  <.001  .41 
Preparation on the day (.95)  Defended   8      17       37  38  220 
     Left  29      26       34  11  204 58.37  <.001  .37 
Awareness of fire danger  Defended   8        8       25  59  166 
    Weather (.88)   Left  15      17       26  42  158 11.53   009 ns  .19 
Awareness of approaching  Defended   3      22       55  20  221 
    Fire (.92)    Left    6      25       60    9  214 11.14  .011 ns  .16 
Readiness to take   Defended 17      28       30  25  214 
    survival action (.83)  Left  10      29       29  32  210 5.40  .145 ns  .15 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
aFigures in brackets are inter-rater reliability indices as Cohen’s Kappa 
bBonferroni critical p value is .05/6 = .008 





Percentage of each group of survivors reporting a specific decision influence, Chi-square tests, and transcript examples 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




pbc Cramer’s                
V 
Examplesd 





    
Self-efficacy (.85) 40% 3% 84.89 < .001 .44 Stayed: ...when I saw the fire coming, and it was just a grass 
fire, I said ‘well, we can handle that.’ (#060) 
Left: ...And I was quite confident what I was doing, but it was 
difficult to see. I mean, I could have run off the road but I knew 




25% 63% 63.99 < .001 .38 Stayed: ...we saw the smoke. We knew it was time to make a 
decision and I decided I’d stay and see if I could control any 
embers coming on to our property. (#076) 
Left: And I looked up...and saw a huge glow in the sky...and I 
said ‘that’s not smoke, that’s fire’. And we said ‘right, we’re 




78% 41% 61.90 < .001 .38 Stayed: We’d always said, the three of us, that if there was a 
fire we would defend. Simple as that. (#102) 
Left: It just hadn’t been practical to spend the time and money 
in setting ourselves up in order to stay. So we knew that if there 





30% 3% 58.84 < .001 .37 Stayed: ...as far as preparation and everything else, no I 
don’t think there is anything more we could have done.  
We were as prepared as we could be. (# 044) 
Left: I said to the kids ‘Follow me straight to the Recreation 
Centre in Flowerdale’. Which I thought was the safest place, 
which as it turned out, it was. (#307) 
 
Family safety 9% 27% 25.02 < .001 .24 Stayed: As for leaving the house, I knew J____ and the boys 
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concerns (.88) were going to be here (defending) and I couldn’t have gone off 
and left them. (#106) 
Left: In my mind always I’ve said to M____ if there’s any sort 
of threat I don’t care about the house. I’d just rather be with 
the kids and be safe. (#061) 
 
Perceived threat 
from fire (.91) 
31% 48% 13.64 < .001 .18 Stayed: Somebody said to me ‘why didn’t you get in the cars 
and leave?’ because we had them sitting there. I said I couldn’t 
have driven them out through that fire for anything. (#067) 
Left: Then a massive roar came and the flames came over the 






37% 63% 8.80 .003 .14 Stayed: The neighbours came from next door and told us there 
was a fire, so we got ready. (#167) 
Left: ...and my friend rang me back and said you should 
probably think about going now, so he was obviously a lot 
more aware of what was going on than we were. (#105) 
 
Lack of warning, no 
alternative (.83) 
26% 19% 3.55 .060 ns . 09 Stayed: We saw (the fire) jump there and we thought, no we 
can’t go now. So we were going to stay, we weren’t going to 
go. (#060) 
Left: I went inside and grabbed my car keys, and it’s lucky I 
had my keys inside because if I’d stayed outside I wouldn’t 




16% 22% 3.05 .081 ns .08 Stayed: Then it got to the stage where I had to go to rescue the 
horse here. So I got the horse out and got back to the house. 
(#097) 
Left: One of the things that prompted me to to leave early was 
with five dogs I didn’t like my chances in a panic of getting 




1% 3% 2.17 .141 ns .07 Stayed:  That’s the other thing.  That’s another reason why I 
had to fight for it (--the house-).  I’m not that rich, I can’t 
afford insurance. (#257) 
Left: [Interviewer] – Now why did you make the decision to 





Perceived fire threat 
greater than 
expected (.88) 
14% 11% 1.03 .310 ns .05 Stayed: ...get a bucket ready for after, to put the fires out, 
and I did all that.  But the fire was so aggressive, all of a 
sudden all the windows exploded in my house and black 
smoke came in and I couldn't breathe anymore, so I had 
to go outside. (# 042) 
Left: I was at home and I thought, oh yeah, the bushfire’s 
coming so no problems. So I got everything set up for a 
small bushfire. Once it came over that hill, mate, I’m out 




57% 43% 0.12 .740 ns .02 Stayed: On the Saturday we were just keeping an eye on things 
and listening to the radio news about where the fire was going, 
and watching the smoke. (#102) 
Left: So we listened to the (local) radio and about half an hour 
after, it came on the radio that there was a large fire at 




a Figures in brackets are inter-rater reliability indices as Cohen’s Kappa; householders could report more than one decision influence 
b Bonferroni critical p value = .05/12 = .004 
c ns = not significant 
d Number in brackets is the interview transcript number 
 
 
